Written by Judge Watts on .
About the Author
Judge, Court of Appeals of Maryland
Issue: Did an attorney violate Rule 8.4 of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct when she transferred a handgun to a former client that she should have known could not legally possess a firearm?
Holding: By giving a handgun to a client despite information which cast doubt upon his lawful possession of a firearm, this lawyer's behavior was prejudicial to the administration of justice and was of the type that negatively impacts the public’s perception of the legal profession in violation of Rule 8.4. In reaching this conclusion, the Court took the unusual step of countermanding Bar Counsel's request that the case be dismissed. Since Bar Counsel had not previously recommended any sanction in a case that he wanted to dismiss, the Court ordered the parties to provide recommendations as to sanctions.
Alleged Violations: Rule 8.4 of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct.
Citation: 436 Md. 504, 83 A.3d 781 (2014)
PANEL: BARBERA, C.J., HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, ADKINS, McDONALD, WATTS, JJ.
Opinion by WATTS, J.
This attorney discipline proceeding concerns a Maryland lawyer who purchased and gave a handgun to a person who could not legally possess a regulated firearm.
The State charged Sandra Lynn Reno ("Reno"), Respondent, a member of the Bar of Maryland, with violating the statute that is currently codified as Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety (2003, 2011 Repl. Vol., 2013 Supp.) ("PS") § 5-144. Reno pled not guilty pursuant to an agreed statement of facts, which stated that Reno had given a handgun to Cortney Stevens ("Stevens"), who could not legally possess a regulated firearm. Reno was found guilty, received probation before judgment, and reported herself to the Attorney Grievance Commission ("the Commission"), Petitioner.
On March 19, 2013, in this Court, the Commission, through Bar Counsel, filed a "Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action" against Reno, charging her with violating Maryland Lawyers' Rule of Professional Conduct ("MLRPC") 8.4 (Misconduct). On March 22, 2013, we referred the attorney discipline proceeding to the Honorable Jane Cairns Murray ("the hearing judge") of the Circuit Court for Cecil County. On September 4, 2013, the hearing judge conducted a hearing. On October 25, 2013, the hearing judge filed in this Court an opinion including findings of fact, and conclusions of law indicating that Reno did not violate MLRPC 8.4(b) (Criminal Act), 8.4(c) (Dishonesty, Fraud, Deceit, or Misrepresentation), 8.4(d) (Conduct Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice), or 8.4(a) (Violating MLRPC).
Page 2 On November
8, 2013, in this Court, the Commission filed a "Notice of Dismissal,"
requesting that this Court dismiss the attorney discipline proceeding.
On December 10, 2013, we heard oral argument. For the below reasons,
we: decline to dismiss the attorney discipline proceeding; conclude
that Reno violated MLRPC 8.4(d) and 8.4(a); and give the parties an
opportunity to recommend sanctions.
Hearing Judge's Findings of Fact
In her opinion, the hearing judge found the following facts, which
we summarize. On December 19, 1991, this Court admitted Reno to the Bar
of Maryland. In 2002, Reno began practicing criminal law at the Law
Offices of Jim Baldwin. On or about February 18, 2004, Cortney Stevens
was convicted of possession of a controlled dangerous substance other
than marijuana. In 2005, Reno met Stevens and later served as his
lawyer. In 2008, while represented by someone other than Reno, Stevens
was convicted of making a false prescription. Sometime before 2010,
Stevens informed Reno "that he had a prior drug charge for which he
received probation before judgment." "Stevens also informed [Reno] of a
prescription forgery charge." On or about September 14, 2010, Stevens
visited Chesapeake Guns, a firearms store in Stevensville. At
Chesapeake Guns, Stevens completed an application to buy a Page 3 .45 caliber 1911 handgun.
In a letter dated September 22, 2010, the Firearms Registration Section
of the Maryland State Police informed Stevens that his application had
been disapproved. The letter did not include the reasons for Stevens's
application's disapproval. Reno learned of the letter and testified
that she thought that the reason for Stevens's application's
disapproval was "a minor issue such as a failure [by] Stevens to have
paid a fine." On November 6, 2010, Reno visited On Target, a firearms
store in Severn. At On Target, Reno obtained a .45 caliber 1911 handgun
("the handgun"). Reno immediately transported the handgun to Stevens's
place of employment, where she gave the handgun to Stevens. On November
16, 2010, at her home, Reno was visited by Corporal Marcus Jackson and
Senior Trooper First Class Ryan List ("the troopers") of the Gun
Enforcement Unit of the Maryland State Police. The troopers told Reno
that they were conducting a handgun investigation. Reno "escorted the
troopers to  Stevens'[s home] and retrieved the" handgun, which the
troopers confiscated. Sometime between November 4, 2011, and November
16, 2011, Reno learned that the State had charged her with violating
the statute that is currently codified at PS § 5-144. On February 28,
2012, in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, Reno pled not
guilty and joined the agreed statement of facts. The Circuit Court for
Anne Arundel County granted Reno probation before judgment. Sometime
before October 21, 2013, the records of Reno's criminal case were
Testimony and Findings as to Reno's Knowledge
At the hearing in this attorney discipline proceeding, as a witness for the Commission, Reno testified:
[A]t the time that I asked  Stevens to hold the gun for me, I was not aware that he was a prohibited person[, i.e., a person who cannot legally possess a regulated firearm]. I took that plea anyway because I felt like I should have known better. The statute that I pled not guilty to and agreed statement of facts said that I knowingly participated in the receipt of a regulated firearm by a prohibited person. The truth is I did not know he was a prohibited person, but I felt that it was appropriate to accept responsibility because I should have known.
(Emphasis added). In her opinion, the hearing judge stated: "The evidence . . . merely shows a set of circumstances that [Reno] should have known [that] Stevens was a prohibited person, but it was not established by clear and convincing evidence that [Reno] in fact knew [that Stevens] was a prohibited person." (Emphasis added).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In an attorney discipline proceeding, this Court reviews for clear
error a hearing judge's findings of fact, and reviews without deference
the hearing judge's conclusions of law. See Md. R.
16-759(b)(2)(B) ("The Court shall give due regard to the opportunity of
the hearing judge to assess the credibility of witnesses."); Attorney
Grievance Comm'n v. Mahone, 435 Md. 84, 104, 76 A.3d 1198, 1210
(2013) ("[A] hearing court's findings of fact will not be overruled
unless we determine that they are clearly erroneous." (Citation
omitted)); Md. R. 16-759 (b)(1) ("The Court of Appeals shall review de
novo the circuit court judge's conclusions of law.").Page 5
Neither party excepts to any of the hearing judge's findings of fact. We, therefore, "treat the findings of fact as established[.]" Md. R. 16-759(b)(2)(A). Neither party excepts to any of the hearing judge's conclusions of law. "Ordinarily, we will not look for additional violations where [the Commission] file[s] no exceptions." Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Dore, 433 Md. 685, 707, 73 A.3d 161, 174 (2013). Nonetheless, here, clear and convincing evidence persuades us to reverse the hearing judge's conclusion that Reno did not violate MLRPC 8.4(d), which states: "It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice[.]" "In general, an attorney violates M[L]RPC 8.4(d) when his or her conduct impacts negatively the public's perception or efficacy of the courts or legal profession." Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Rand, 411 Md. 83, 96, 981 A.2d 1234, 1242 (2009) (citation omitted).
Reno negatively impacted the public's perception of the legal profession through committing an illegal act. As the hearing judge found, it is undisputed that Reno gave the handgun (i.e., a regulated firearm) to Stevens, who had been convicted of disqualifying crimes. We do not address the hearing judge's finding that Reno did not know that Page 6 Stevens had been convicted of a disqualifying crime; thus, we do not conclude that Reno violated PS § 5-144(a)(1), which states: "[A] . . . person may not  knowingly participate in the illegal . . . transfer . . . of a regulated firearm in violation of this subtitle[.]" (Emphasis added).
That finding of fact-that Reno did not knowingly participate in transferring the handgun-does not preclude us from determining that Reno violated PS § 5-134(b)(2), a regulatory provision, which states that: "A . . . person may not . . . transfer a regulated firearm to a . . . transferee who the . . . person knows or has reasonable cause to believe . . . has been convicted of a disqualifying crime[.]" (Emphasis added). Although the hearing judge did not address whether Reno had reasonable cause to believe that Stevens had been convicted of a disqualifying crime, we need not remand for the hearing judge to make additional findings of fact. As a conclusion of law-applying the facts found by the hearing judge to PS § 5-134(b)(2)'s legal standard of "reasonable cause"-we conclude that clear and convincing evidence demonstrates that Reno violated PS § 5-134(b)(2). For two reasons, the record clearly and convincingly establishes that Reno had reasonable cause to believe that Stevens had been convicted of a disqualifying crime.
Page 7 First, in Reno's criminal case, based on the agreed statement of facts that Reno joined, the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Reno had violated PS § 5-144(a)(1) by knowingly participating in the illegal transfer of a regulated firearm. If the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County found that Reno violated PS § 5-144(a)(1) by knowingly participating in the illegal transfer of a regulated firearm, then Reno necessarily had reasonable cause to believe that Stevens had been convicted of a disqualifying crime and violated PS § 5-134(b)(2) by transferring the handgun to him.
Second, independent of the findings of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, Stevens's statements to Reno, credited in the hearing judge's findings of fact, provided reasonable cause to believe that Stevens had been convicted of a disqualifying crime. The hearing judge found that: (1) Stevens informed Reno "that he had a prior drug charge for which he received probation before judgment"; and (2) "Stevens also informed [Reno] of a prescription forgery charge." Even if Stevens did not tell Reno that he had been convicted of possession of a controlled dangerous substance other than marijuana and making a false prescription, it was incumbent upon Reno to ask Stevens whether one or both charges resulted in convictions before giving the handgun to Stevens. Indeed-as Reno explicitly conceded, and as the hearing judge explicitly found-Reno Page 8 "should have known" that Stevens had been convicted of a disqualifying crime. (Emphasis added). For the above reasons, we are satisfied that clear and convincing evidence establishes that Reno committed an illegal act in violation of PS § 5-134(b)(2).
It is abundantly clear that Reno violated MLRPC 8.4(d), which provides: "It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice[.]" We have described "[a]n act prejudicial to the administration of justice [as] one that `tends to bring the legal profession into disrepute.'" Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Goodman, 426 Md. 115, 128, 43 A.2d 988, 995 (2012) (citation omitted). As the hearing judge found, Reno knew that: (1) Stevens had applied to buy a .45 caliber 1911 handgun; and (2) the Firearms Registration Section of the Maryland State Police disapproved Stevens's application. Nonetheless, Reno gave Stevens a handgun of the exact type for which he had applied. Even if (as the hearing judge found) Reno thought that the reason for Stevens's application's disapproval was "a minor issue such as a failure [by] Stevens to have paid a fine[,]" Reno nonetheless circumvented the law by giving the handgun to Stevens. As such, Reno, a criminal defense attorney, provided a gun to a person, a former client, whom she had reason to know was prohibited from possessing a firearm. Reno circumvented the law-and, indeed, violated the law-as to a prohibited person's possession of a firearm. Thus, Reno engaged in behavior Page 9 prejudicial to the administration of justice as well as conduct "impact[ing] negatively the public's perception . . . of the . . . legal profession." Rand, 411 Md. at 96, 981 A.2d at 1242 (citations omitted).
We also conclude that Reno violated MLRPC 8.4(a), which states: "It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . violate . . . the" MLRPC.
From the hearing judge's findings of fact, we ascertain no basis to conclude, however, that Reno violated MLRPC 8.4(b) (criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects) or 8.4(c) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation). Although Reno committed an illegal act by violating PS § 5-134(b)(2), a violation of PS § 5-134(b)(2) alone does not appear to be a criminal act as Title 5 ("Firearms") of the Public Safety Article does not set a penalty for violation of PS § 5-134(b)(2).
Because the Commission moved to dismiss, neither party recommended a sanction for Reno's misconduct. Instead of determining an appropriate sanction on our own initiative, we give Reno and the Commission the opportunity to recommend a sanction for Reno's violation of MLRPC 8.4(d) and 8.4(a). The parties shall file recommendations within thirty days of the date on which this opinion is filed. "Within 15 days after service of . . . recommendations, the adverse party may file a response." Md. R. 16-758(c). After receiving recommendations and responses (if any), we will schedule oral argument regarding the appropriate sanction.
IT IS SO ORDERED.